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The equitable doctrine of resulting trusts plays a significant role in defining and 
allocating the rights and responsibilities of adult children and older adult parents 
who are co-holders of joint bank accounts. Where equity deems the adult child to be a 
resulting trustee for their parent, it also imposes a rule that the adult child must follow 
the directions of the older adult, that is, a beneficiary-direction rule. This rule suffices 
to hold to account a financially abusive adult child co-holder, but it appears to preclude 
a beneficiary-protection power, that is, a power of an honest adult child co-holder to 
take protective action, against the wishes of the older adult, to safeguard the parent 
from financial abuse by others. This article explores, from a Canadian perspective, but 
with comparative aspects, the preference of equity for a beneficiary-direction rule over 
a beneficiary-protection power in the context of joint bank account resulting trusts. 
While it is contended that it is possible for equity to recognize a beneficiary-protection 
power, by analogizing such resulting trusts to express trusts, it is ultimately concluded 
that the preference for the beneficiary-direction rule is reasonable. That conclusion is 
reached on the basis of considerations of precedent and policy that give rise to a number 
of interconnected barriers to this analogy. However, since it can be anticipated that a 
need for protective action might arise, it is argued that equity should respect an express 
grant of protective power. This, in turn, has implications for lawyers and other advisors 
on financial affairs and related legal matters. 
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I. Introduction
In Canada, as in the comparable common law jurisdictions of England and Wales, and Australia, it is increasingly being recognized that older 
adults are vulnerable to financial abuse by people with whom they are 
closely involved in their day-to-day lives, including their adult children.1 
One means of financial abuse can occur when an older adult is influenced 
by an adult child to draw on her savings for expenses that are partially 
or entirely to the benefit of the adult child, rather than the older adult. 
Just such a situation was at issue in the relatively recent Canadian case 
of Bakken Estate v Bakken.2 A dispute arose between an adult son, who 
was suspected of selfishly influencing his elderly mother, and his adult 
1. See e.g. Senate of Canada, Special Senate Committee on Aging, Canada’s 
Aging Population: Seizing the Opportunity (April 2009) at 24-26 (Chair: 
Sharon Carstairs); UK, House of Commons, Health Committee, Elder 
Abuse: Second Report of Session 2003-04, vol 1 (March 2004) at 23-25 
(Chair: David Hinchliffe); Government of South Australia, Department 
for Health and Ageing, Strategy to Safeguard the Rights of Older South 
Australians 2014-2021, (May 2014) at 15.
2. 2014 BCSC 1540 [Bakken Estate].
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sister who, as co-holder of the joint bank account from which money was 
being withdrawn by her mother, made a preventative withdrawal of the 
funds remaining in the account. The daughter’s motive was to protect her 
mother’s assets. So motivated, the daughter’s action may appear, at least 
at first blush, to be a morally understandable and appropriate exercise of 
her capacity to protect her mother’s interests. Indeed, it might even be 
thought that the daughter was not merely morally entitled, but morally 
obliged, to act. However, on the present state of the law, which in this 
area is heavily dependent on equity, a strong argument could be made 
that the daughter acted wrongfully, would be required to immediately 
reverse the withdrawal and would be liable for any damage or loss 
associated with her wrong. Although ultimately resolved in favour of the 
daughter on other grounds, the Bakken Estate case illustrates a difficult 
issue that can arise for adult children who are co-holders of joint bank 
accounts with their older adult parents — namely, whether the adult 
child is entitled to act protectively against the immediate wishes of the 
older adult. The objective of this article is to explore and assess the legal 
framework applicable to this issue, with a focus on the role played by the 
rules and principles of equity.
Equitable rules and principles, particularly in the area of resulting 
trusts, are intimately involved in the definition and allocation of rights 
and responsibilities between joint bank account holders, at least where 
one of the co-holders is the source of all of the original funds in the 
account. Typically, if the older adult intended that the funds would only 
be used for her benefit during her life, then the funds will be subject 
to a resulting trust in favour of the older adult and the co-holding 
adult child will only be permitted to deal with the funds for the older 
adult’s benefit. This general arrangement of rights and responsibilities is 
adequate to address another means of financial abuse of older adults, 
namely, when the co-holding adult child independently and without 
permission expends money from the joint account for her own benefit. 
Selfish expenditure of this kind is a clear violation of the responsibilities 
of a resulting trustee. The numerous cases and decisions attesting to that 
violation rest on the basic rule that resulting trustees may only act with 
the knowledge and consent, or direction, of the older adult beneficiary 
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— what will herein be called the “beneficiary-direction” rule. In contrast, 
there appears to be no Canadian or comparative cases or decisions on 
the issue of whether and to what extent the rules and principles relating 
to resulting trusts might allow or, even, require a resulting trustee to 
proactively protect the older adult from the selfish influence of others 
— what will herein be called a “beneficiary-protection” power (which, 
if not merely allowed but required, would be a duty). At the same time 
though, the doctrine articulated on the basis of the beneficiary-direction 
rule in the cases dealing with selfish resulting trustees appears to leave 
no room for protective action. Moreover, where relevant equitable rules 
and principles have been applied in similar contexts, such as ostensibly 
protective action by adult children holding powers of attorney, those 
children have been held to have acted wrongfully. 
This article considers the apparent preference of equity for a 
beneficiary-direction rule over a beneficiary-protection power in the 
context of adult children who are co-holders of joint bank accounts with 
their older adult parents. Ultimately, it is argued that this preference 
is reasonable in the sense that there are good reasons of precedent and 
policy for equity not to automatically or presumptively provide resulting 
trustees with discretion to act protectively. At the same time though, 
since it can be anticipated that a need for protective action might arise, 
and that a power to act protectively might be useful, the door should 
remain open to the possibility that equity would respect an express 
grant of protective power. The article proceeds in three parts. In Part 
II, it provides an overview of the approach of equity, via the doctrine 
of resulting trusts, to the situation where older adults enter joint bank 
account relationships with an adult child, including how the doctrine 
of resulting trusts identifies and allocates any beneficial interest. Part III 
then situates the doctrine of resulting trusts in relation to other relevant 
areas of equitable doctrine, especially on trustee and fiduciary obligations, 
and contextualizes the issue of the rights and responsibilities of resulting 
trustees. This includes an explanation of the beneficiary-direction rule 
and of the possibility of recognizing a beneficiary-protection power via 
an analogizing of the position of a resulting trustee to that of an express 
trustee. Part IV then identifies and assesses four barriers to that analogy, 
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namely: (i) the paramountcy of the resulting trust approach and the 
beneficiary-direction rule in cases addressing joint bank accounts; (ii) the 
mixed treatment of, and concerns raised over, claims to a beneficiary-
protection power in non-trust fiduciary contexts; (iii) the consistency 
between the judicial preference for the beneficiary-direction rule and the 
balancing of the interests of older adults in related statutory regimes and 
law reform initiatives; and, finally, (iv) the likelihood that older adults 
may somewhat consciously prefer to avoid an express trust approach to 
joint bank accounts. Since the consideration of these barriers leads to a 
finding that the preference for a beneficiary-direction rule is reasonable, 
Part V provides a brief discussion of the possibility of leaving the door 
open to equitable recognition for express grants of protective power, 
including mention of the implications for lawyers and others providing 
advice to older adults on their financial affairs. As it proceeds, the analysis 
conducted in this article offers a modest comparative dimension in that it 
gives some attention to case law and other relevant material from England 
and Wales, and Australia. 
II. Older Adult Joint Bank Accounts and Resulting 
Trusts
Canadian and comparative case law provide numerous illustrations of 
older adults creating joint bank accounts with one or more of their adult 
children.3 Often this occurs in the context of the older adult considering 
issues of capacity or convenience in managing her financial affairs as 
she ages, as well as issues of estate planning. In a typical scenario, an 
3. From Canada, see e.g. Ast v Mikolas, 2010 BCSC 127; Miller v Miller, 
2011 ONSC 7239 [Miller]; Coulston v Dixon, 2014 ONSC 6134; Gollan 
v Burnett, 2014 BCSC 2424; Sawdon Estate v Sawdon, 2014 ONCA 101 
[Sawdon]; Mroz v Mroz, 2015 ONCA 171. From the UK, see e.g. Aroso v 
Coutts & Co, [2001] EWHC 443 (Comm); Re Northall (Deceased), [2010] 
EWHC 1448 (Ch) [Northall]; Drakeford v Cotton, [2012] EWHC 1414 
(Ch) [Drakeford]; Mathews v Revenue and Customs Commissioners, [2012] 
UKUT 658 (TCC). From Australia (and New Zealand), see e.g. Russell 
v Scott (1936), 55 CLR 440 (HCA); Oliver v Davison (24 August 1983), 
NSW BC8311926 (SC)(QL) [Oliver]; Re Brownlee, [1990] 3 NZLR 243 
(HC); Logan v Gardiner, [2006] NSWSC 1069 [Logan].
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older adult creates a new joint bank account with an adult child and is 
the sole contributor of funds to the account. The older adult intends to 
retain control over the funds for the remainder of her life, but also wants 
an adult child to have the power to assist with financial transactions, 
as needed. In terms of empowering the assistance of the adult child, 
creation of a joint bank account makes this possible because, at common 
law, a joint bank account is a recognized form of joint tenancy, with each 
co-holder entitled to an undivided share of the funds in the account and 
associated individual and independent rights of deposit and withdrawal. 
However, at common law, there is no recognition of the primacy of the 
older adult’s interests; it is equity that provides that recognition, through 
the doctrine of resulting trusts. 
The equitable doctrine of resulting trusts is multi-faceted and applies 
to a variety of situations that can be quite different but, to over-simplify, 
have in common a voluntary transfer of property that is not intended to 
benefit the recipient.4 The general operation of the doctrine of resulting 
trusts can be illustrated in the context of the creation of a joint bank 
account co-held by an older adult and an adult child. Where, as is typical, 
4. This is an over-simplification in two senses. First, there is a lively 
jurisprudential debate about whether the basis of resulting trusts is 
intention or restitution. For a comprehensive overview of the law of 
resulting trusts, which argues for a restitution-based approach, see Robert 
Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
[Chambers, Resulting Trusts]. For an encapsulation and view of the debate 
over the appropriate approach, see John Mee, “Presumed Resulting Trusts, 
Intention, and Declaration” (2014) 73:1 Cambridge Law Journal 86. 
Second, resulting trusts can arise in circumstances of error (for example, 
unintended shortcomings in the establishment of an express trust) or 
mistake (for example, a misplaced deposit into the wrong bank account), 
where the question of intention is more complicated or, perhaps, less 
fruitfully explored. Often, circumstances of error and mistake, among 
others, are said to give rise to “automatic resulting trusts”, whereas 
circumstances such as those currently under discussion in relation to 
joint bank accounts are said to give rise to “presumed intention resulting 
trusts”. For an overview of resulting trusts that is structured around 
this nomenclature, see Dennis Pavlich, Trusts in Common-Law Canada 
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2014).
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the older adult contributes all of the funds to the joint account, equity 
presumes that the older adult did not intend to transfer the beneficial 
proprietary interest (or, in other words, the equitable interest) in the 
funds to the adult child.5 Or, to put it the other way around, equity 
presumes that the older adult intended to retain the benefit of the funds. 
The effect of the presumption of a resulting trust is two-fold. First, 
when the presumption arises, equity presumptively binds the legal rights 
obtained by the adult child upon the creation of the joint account with 
a trust relationship that distinguishes the beneficial or equitable interest 
in the funds and allocates that interest to (or, in historical language, 
“results” that interest back to) the older adult. Second, having imposed 
this presumptive allocation, equity then places the onus of proof on any 
party who may oppose that allocation, whether it is the co-holding adult 
child or a third party, to show that there was an intention to transfer 
the beneficial interest. Where such an intention is demonstrated, the 
presumption of resulting trust is rebutted and the recipient will usually 
be regarded as having received an immediate gift of the funds. The courts 
have identified a variety of factors that can be considered in attempting 
to prove the intention of the older adult, but before discussing those it 
is necessary to recognize two possibilities that may affect the resulting 
trust analysis. First, there is the possibility of the older adult establishing 
the joint account in circumstances that give rise to a contrary equitable 
presumption, namely, the presumption of advancement. Second, there 
is the possibility of the older adult having distinct intentions as to the 
benefit of the funds in the account during the older adult’s life and the 
benefit of the funds remaining in the account upon the older adult’s 
death.
5. Technically speaking, the proprietary rights exist not in any money itself, 
but in the chose in action that arises through the creation of a bank 
account and that defines the rights and obligations of the bank and the 
account holders in relation to each other.
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In terms of the contrary equitable presumption of advancement, 
historically, it applied where the voluntary transferor, or donor, was the 
husband or father of the donee. In situations of that type, the donor was 
presumed to be intending to make an “advance” of anticipated future 
entitlements of a wife or child. In other words, equity presumed that a gift 
was intended. In the context of a joint bank account, this would mean that 
if the older adult created co-holding rights in his wife or his child, then the 
wife or child would be presumed to have received an immediate (i.e. inter 
vivos) gift of the beneficial interest in the funds. Consequently, in equity, 
any party seeking to contest that presumptive allocation of the beneficial 
interest would have the onus of proving that there was no intention to 
give or, in other words, that there was an intention to retain the beneficial 
interest. The current status of the presumption of advancement differs 
among common law jurisdictions. In Canada, since the decision in Pecore 
v Pecore,6 the presumption has been extended to apply equally to both 
husbands/fathers and wives/mothers, but, with respect to parent-to-child 
voluntary transfers, has been restricted to minor children. On the other 
hand, in some Canadian provinces, statutory intervention in relation to 
spousal division of property on breakdown of family relationship requires 
that the presumption of resulting trust be applied — and therefore that 
the presumption of advancement not apply — to all voluntary transfers 
of property between the spouses.7 However, some of these statutes also 
provide that, where spouses are co-holders of joint bank accounts, they 
will be presumed to be jointly entitled, subject to demonstration of a 
contrary intention.8 For England and Wales, the historical common law 
6. 2007 SCC 17 [Pecore SCC].
7. Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 14 [Family Law Act Ontario]; The 
Family Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3, s 50(1) [Family Property Act 
Saskatchewan]; Matrimonial Property Act, RSNS 1989, c 275, s 21(1) 
[Matrimonial Property Act Nova Scotia].
8. Family Law Act Ontario, ibid, ss 14(a), 14(b); Family Property Act 
Saskatchewan, supra note 7, s 50(2)(a); Matrimonial Property Act Nova 
Scotia, supra note 7, s 21(1)(a); The Family Property Act, CCSM c F25, s 
35(4); Matrimonial Property Act, RSA 2000, c M-8, s 36(2)(a).
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position has remained unchanged,9 but the presumption of advancement 
has been statutorily abolished.10 In Australia, there has been no statutory 
intervention and no evolution in the common law position.11 At any rate, 
in the illustrative joint bank account situation providing the present (and 
Canadian) context, the presumption of advancement would not apply 
because the co-holding child is an adult. Therefore, the presumption of 
resulting trust would apply. 
Moving then to the second possibility, in any assessment of the older 
adult donor’s intention in terms of giving or retaining a beneficial interest 
in the joint bank account funds, it is necessary to recognize the possibility 
of her having distinct intentions as to the benefit of the funds in the 
account during her life and to the benefit of the funds remaining in the 
account upon her death. Doctrinally, this possibility has been managed 
by allowing the older adult to have a distinct intention for the transfer of 
the right to survivorship that is an inherent element of a joint tenancy. By 
virtue of the right of survivorship, when either of the two co-holders of 
the joint account dies, the survivor is automatically vested with the sole 
interest in the remaining funds. Equitable doctrine has accepted that an 
9. The approach taken in Pecore SCC, supra note 6, does not appear to 
have been expressly rejected in any cases from England and Wales, but 
Glister has suggested that the traditional conception of the presumption 
of advancement is treated as so well entrenched in both England and 
Australia that it would be highly unlikely that any court in those 
jurisdictions would adopt the Canadian approach: see Jamie Glister, “Is 
There a Presumption of Advancement?” (2011) 33:1 Sydney Law Review 
39 at 49 [Glister, “Presumption of Advancement”].
10. Equality Act 2010 (UK), c 15, s 199; for a critical appraisal of this 
intervention, see Jamie Glister, “Section 199 of the Equality Act 2010: 
How Not to Abolish the Presumption of Advancement” (2010) 73:5 
Modern Law Review 807.
11. For an overview of the status of the presumption of advancement 
in Australia and other Commonwealth jurisdictions, see Glister, 
“Presumption of Advancement”, supra note 9 at 49. For discussion of 
the need to consider statutory intervention in Australia, in the context 
of voluntary transfers relating to land, see Susan Barkehall-Thomas, 
“Parent to Child Transfers: Gift or Resulting Trust?” (2010) 18:1 Australia 
Property Law Journal 75.
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older adult may intend both to retain the benefit of funds in a joint bank 
account during her life and to have the right of survivorship operate, 
in favour of the co-holding adult child, on any funds remaining in the 
account upon her death. One reason for this dual-intention can be that 
the older adult wishes to avoid having the remaining funds transfer as 
part of her estate under her will. Depending upon the circumstances, it 
can be either more convenient (e.g. the rights of the surviving co-holder 
are already recognized by the financial institution) or less costly (e.g. 
lower probate fees) for property to transfer upon death by virtue of the 
right to survivorship, rather than via a testamentary disposition (i.e. her 
will). Although the doctrinal approach of allowing a distinct gift of an 
equitable interest in the right of survivorship is vulnerable to criticism as 
inconsistent with some of the basic rules and principles of property law 
in common law systems,12 it is now well entrenched.13 The recognition 
of the possibility of distinct intentions for the beneficial interest in 
the jointly-held funds during life and after death must therefore be 
considered in any analysis of whether a presumption of resulting trust 
has been rebutted.
Having acknowledged the relevance of the possibilities of the 
presumption of advancement and of distinct intentions, I now return 
to the work of the courts in identifying a variety of factors that may be 
taken into account in discerning the intention of the older adult creating 
a joint bank account. Obviously enough, the primary factor is any verbal 
or documented expression of intention by the older adult at the time 
of establishing the joint account. In addition, and as held in Pecore, a 
variety of other factors are also eligible for consideration, specifically: acts 
and declarations subsequent to the creation of the account that indicate 
the intention at the time of establishing the account; contents of bank 
documents relating to the account; control and use of the account during 
the lifetime of the older adult; any grants of power of attorney; and, the 
tax treatment of the funds in the account. In examining evidence relating 
12. See, e.g. Michael J Welters & Emma A McArthur, “Pecore’s Troubles” 
(2010) 29:2 Estates, Trusts & Pensions Journal 139 at 149-60.
13. Pecore SCC, supra note 6 at para 50; Drakeford, supra note 3 at para 73; 
Oliver, supra note 3.
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to any of these factors, the question is always what the intention of the 
older adult was at the time of the creation of the joint account. In joint 
bank account situations where the presumption of resulting trust is not 
rebutted, the beneficial interest in the legal proprietary rights that the co-
holding adult child enjoys with respect to the account will remain with 
the older adult. In other words, the legal proprietary rights of the adult 
child will be bound by a resulting trust in favour of the older adult. To 
illustrate the application of the doctrine of resulting trusts in the context 
of joint bank accounts, as well as how consideration of the various factors 
can lead to different conclusions on the older adult’s intentions, I will 
briefly review Pecore and Bakken Estate.
In Pecore, an older adult father created joint bank accounts with his 
adult daughter. Following the death of the father, a dispute arose between 
the daughter and her ex-spouse as to the balance of funds remaining 
in the joint bank accounts. Both the daughter and her ex-spouse were 
beneficiaries under the father’s will, but the ex-spouse stood to gain if the 
balance in the accounts did not vest solely in the daughter, via the right 
of survivorship, but, rather, became part of the residue of the father’s 
estate. The trial judge decided that the presumption of advancement 
applied and that, considering a number of the relevant factors, it had 
not been rebutted.14 The trial judge did not clearly distinguish beneficial 
entitlement to the funds in the accounts during the father’s lifetime from 
the beneficial right to survivorship but, since the father was deceased, 
the decision that the daughter had been given the rights of survivorship 
was sufficient. On appeal, the trial judge’s decision was upheld, although 
the appeal court took the approach that since the father’s intention to 
make a gift of the rights of survivorship was sufficiently clear, there was 
no need to invoke the presumption of advancement.15 On further appeal 
to the Supreme Court,16 Justice Rothstein, on behalf of the majority, 
held that neither of the lower courts had taken the correct approach but 
that, in the end, they had reached the correct result. As a consequence of 
14. Pecore v Pecore [2004] OTC 188 (Ont Ct J) at paras 28, 44.
15. Pecore v Pecore [2005] 202 OAC 169 (Ont CA) at para 46.
16. Pecore SCC, supra note 6 at para 75, Abella J dissenting in part (on the 
revision of the presumption of advancement). 
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reworking the Canadian approach to the presumption of advancement, 
as mentioned above, Rothstein J held that it was instead the presumption 
of resulting trust that applied. Moving to a consideration of intention, 
the following evidence pointed in favour of an intention of the father not 
to retain an interest in the rights of survivorship: the father and daughter 
had a close relationship; the daughter relied upon the father for financial 
assistance; the father was concerned to provide for his daughter after his 
death; and, in his dealings with his lawyer in relation to his will, the 
father had treated ownership of the joint accounts as not passing via his 
estate. Evidence that the father alone had controlled and used the funds 
in the account during his life and had paid all relevant taxes was treated 
as indicating that the father intended to retain his beneficial interest in 
the funds in the accounts during his life, but also as not inconsistent with 
an intention to give the rights to survivorship. More potentially contra-
indicating was evidence that the father had written letters to financial 
institutions declaring that the joint accounts were not a gift to his daughter, 
but these were ultimately dismissed from relevance on the basis that they 
merely evinced an intention to avoid triggering an immediate liability to 
capital gains tax (which, again, was not inconsistent with intending to 
give the rights of survivorship). Ultimately then, Rothstein J found that 
there was ample justification for the trial judge’s finding that the father 
had intended to make a gift of the rights of survivorship and so, even 
though the analysis needed to be framed in terms of the presumption of 
resulting trust, rather than the presumption of advancement, the result 
would be the same and so the appeal could be dismissed.
As such, Pecore established the currently prevailing Canadian 
approach to application of the doctrine of resulting trusts to the situation 
where an older adult enters a joint bank account relationship with an 
adult child. This approach was followed in Bakken Estate, but led to a 
different outcome.17 In Bakken Estate, the British Columbia Supreme 
Court decided that the presumption of resulting trust that arose upon 
the creation of the joint account between the older adult mother and her 
adult daughter was rebutted both with respect to the beneficial interest 
17. Bakken Estate, supra note 2. 
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in the funds during the mother’s life and with respect to the balance 
remaining upon the mother’s death. As mentioned earlier, the need to 
decide upon the allocation of proprietary rights in this case arose in the 
context of a dispute between the co-holding adult daughter and an adult 
male sibling. The adult brother was living with the mother, and helping 
her to manage the family business, when suspicions arose that he was 
improperly influencing his mother to make withdrawals from the joint 
account for his own benefit. In response, the co-holding daughter made 
a preventative withdrawal of the remaining funds in the account. Her 
brother, on the mother’s behalf, sought legal advice on the possibility 
of contesting his sister’s right to make such a withdrawal and the action 
was commenced a few months later. Less than two months after the 
commencement of the litigation, a medical assessment concluded that 
the mother lacked the mental competence to capably manage her own 
financial affairs and this led to the Office of the Public Guardian and 
Trustee (“PGT”) becoming involved to act as Committee for the mother. 
Before or despite the PGT assuming this role, and less than two weeks 
after she was assessed as incapable, the mother purported to transfer 
her most significant real property interest — the land upon which she 
lived and operated the family business — into a joint tenancy with her 
son. As the litigation process was unfolding, the PGT investigated the 
management of the mother’s financial affairs and informed the lawyer 
for the son and mother that it would not commence its own proceedings 
relating to the withdrawal from the joint bank account but, rather, was 
contemplating doing so in relation to the transfer of the real property 
interest. That is to say, the PGT was more concerned about the actions 
of the son than of his sister. The mother died nine months after the 
litigation was commenced. The son, who was the executor of her estate 
and a co-beneficiary with all of his siblings, continued the litigation on 
behalf of the estate. At this point the dispute had developed a similar 
complexion to the dispute in Pecore in that the determination of the issue 
of whether a resulting trust existed in relation to the joint bank account 
would determine whether the co-holding daughter, or the estate, was the 
rightful owner of the withdrawn amount and the balance in the account.
In finding that the presumption of resulting trust had been rebutted, 
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the trial judge in Bakken Estate noted evidence that all of the adult 
children, except the impugned brother, agreed that the purpose of the 
creation of the joint account was to give the co-holding daughter a gift of 
an inheritance of $100,000 that the mother had recently received from 
her deceased sister. This was justified on the basis that, over the years, the 
mother had given substantially less financial assistance to that daughter 
than to her other children. The judge found that the terms on which the 
bank account was established were effective to grant full and equal rights 
to the joint holders. There was incomplete evidence on the use of the 
funds in the joint account, as only two uses were mentioned but they do 
not account for the full amount of the funds. First, soon after opening 
the account, the mother unilaterally transferred the full $100,000 into 
a separate investment holding, seemingly in her name only. The capital 
initially grew but, when it then declined to approximately $90,000, the 
co-holding daughter assisted the mother in terminating the investment 
and re-depositing that amount into the joint account. The second use 
of the account mentioned in evidence was the daughter’s preventative 
withdrawal of $69,970, which was the balance in the joint account at that 
time. There was no evidence to account for the approximately $20,000 
difference, although it would seem that this money may have been that 
which was expended by the mother under her son’s influence. Despite 
this lack of evidential clarity, the trial judge found that the co-holding 
daughter had not otherwise drawn on the joint account. Although 
this finding, combined with the mother’s earlier unilateral withdrawal, 
potentially indicated that neither regarded the co-holding daughter as 
the beneficial owner of the funds, the judge held that these facts were 
not conclusive and nor was either fact necessarily inconsistent with an 
intention to make an immediate gift of the originally deposited funds. 
On the other hand, the judge noted that the daughter had declared the 
interest earned on the invested funds, which was consistent with a gift. On 
the basis of this accumulation of circumstances, the trial judge in Bakken 
Estate held that the presumption of resulting trust had been rebutted both 
with respect to the funds in the joint account during the mother’s life and 
with respect to the balance of funds upon her death. Consequently, as the 
sole beneficial owner of the funds, the co-holding daughter was entitled 
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to make the withdrawal, regardless of her preventative intentions. Since 
she had been given the funds in the joint account when it was created, 
she was entitled to deal with the funds as she saw fit. In the context of 
the case, and especially with regards to the undue influence apparently 
being wielded by the son over his mother, the finding that the funds had 
been given to the daughter upon creation of the joint account seems 
morally appropriate because it effectively denied the son a share of the 
funds and relieved the daughter of any liability to her mother’s estate. 
The legal appropriateness of the decision is perhaps more questionable 
though, because the facts seem to point as much, if not more, in the 
direction of both the mother and the daughter intending that the mother 
retain the benefit of the funds during her life, rather than in the direction 
of the mother immediately relinquishing that benefit to her daughter. 
But if the court had held that the presumption of resulting trust had 
not been rebutted in relation to the funds during the mother’s life, then 
it would have had to grapple with the apparent preference of equitable 
doctrine for a beneficiary-direction rule over a beneficiary-protection 
power. Consideration of that preference raises the more general issue — 
that did not fall to be addressed in either Pecore or Bakken Estate — of the 
rights and responsibilities of a resulting trustee. This article now moves 
to that territory, which requires a consideration of the broader context of 
relevant equitable doctrines and statutory regimes. 
III. Equitable Doctrine on the Rights and 
Responsibilities of Trustees and Fiduciaries: The 
Possibility of a Beneficiary-Protection Power
In order to identify and explain the rights and responsibilities of resulting 
trustees it is necessary to situate resulting trust doctrine with respect to 
other areas of equitable doctrine applicable to trustees and fiduciaries 
more generally. This part thus begins with an overview of equitable 
doctrine on trustee and fiduciary obligations and then proceeds to explain 
the extent to which different types of trustees are subject to a beneficiary-
direction rule or, instead, enjoy a zone of autonomy from the wishes 
of their beneficiaries. This leads to an introduction of the possibility of 
recognizing a beneficiary-protection power via an analogizing of the 
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position of a resulting trustee to that of an express trustee who enjoys 
some autonomy. 
The legal roles of trustees and fiduciaries are creatures of equity. 
These roles, and the rights and responsibilities that go along with them, 
are both distinct and inter-connected. At the outset of providing an 
overview of the relevant components of equitable doctrine applicable 
to trustees and fiduciaries though, and especially in the context of a 
consideration of resulting trustees, it is important to bear in mind the 
following conclusion reached by Chambers in the course of what remains 
one of the few academic inquiries into the role of the resulting trustee:
[j]ust as there is no uniform set of obligations applicable to all fiduciaries, 
there is no one set for all trustees or even all resulting trustees. The principle of 
resulting trust applies in such a wide variety of situations that it is impossible 
to deduce, solely from the classification of resulting trust, that any particular 
set of fiduciary obligations applies.18
According to Chambers then, not only are the rights and responsibilities 
of resulting trustees variable and context-dependent, but also, this reflects 
the fact that, within the general doctrinal frameworks that structure the 
roles of trustees and fiduciaries, there is significant potential for variability 
at the more specific level of particular trustees and fiduciaries. 
Despite the significance of Chambers’ conclusion, which will be 
brought back into play later in this section, the main elements of the 
general doctrinal frameworks applicable to trustees and fiduciaries can be 
outlined. To begin with, all trustees are fiduciaries, but trustees are not 
the only type of fiduciaries. What typically distinguishes trustees from 
other types of fiduciaries — such as lawyers, real estate agents, holders of 
powers of attorney and doctors — is that they hold property and manage it 
in the interests of their beneficiaries.19 At a general level, the fundamental 
responsibility of a fiduciary is the duty of loyalty, which entails acting 
selflessly, without conflict of interest and only in the best interests of 
18. Chambers, Resulting Trusts, supra note 4 at 200.
19. It should be acknowledged that other types of fiduciaries can have trustee 
responsibilities if the need to hold or manage property arises. For instance, 
when lawyers need to handle money or other assets for their clients, they 
are required to use trust accounts. 
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the beneficiary. Moreover, breaches of this fundamental responsibility are 
subject to strict liability in the sense that, for instance, where a fiduciary 
acts in circumstances of conflict of interest, he or she will have committed 
a wrong even if the action was taken honestly, in good faith and with 
reasonable care. As fiduciaries, all types of trustees are similarly bound. 
As such, trustees are an example of the so-called per se or category-based 
types of fiduciaries. People who occupy certain categories of roles, such as 
trustees or guardians or agents, are automatically deemed by equity to be 
acting in a fiduciary capacity and so are subject to fiduciary obligations. 
The unifying characteristic of these roles is an express or implied 
undertaking or understanding that the person occupying the role has the 
capacity to unilaterally affect substantial interests of the other person and 
must only act in that other person’s best interest. This type of fiduciary 
can be contrasted with ad hoc or fact-based types of fiduciaries whose 
classification as fiduciaries arises from application of general principles to 
the particular circumstances that existed at the time the person took on 
the role in question. To simplify, the general principles require an inquiry 
into the existence of circumstances reflecting the unifying characteristic 
of categorical fiduciaries.20
For their part, the primary responsibility of trustees is to properly 
administer and dispose of trust property. The scope and nature of this 
responsibility will vary according to whether the situation involves an 
express trust, a resulting trust, or a constructive trust. In terms of express 
trusts, that is, those trusts that are intentionally created, there are three 
dimensions to the primary responsibility of express trustees. First, express 
trustees are bound by the terms of their trust, as specified by the creator 
of the trust. The terms of express trusts can vary widely and impose 
more or less constraint on the ways in which the trust property must be 
administered and disposed of. A key issue is the amount of discretion 
allowed to the trustee in making decisions about administration and 
20. This summary reflects the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada 
as relatively recently stated in Galambos v Perez, 2009 SCC 48. See also 
Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24.
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disposal.21 A second dimension of the primary responsibility of express 
trustees is that, to the extent they have any discretion, they must exercise 
it honestly, in good faith and in accordance with the requisite standard of 
care. Importantly though, to the extent that an express trustee is directed 
by the terms of the trust to act in certain ways, without an allowance 
for discretion, a showing of honesty, good faith and reasonable care will 
generally be no defense.22 In other words, express trustees are strictly 
liable for breaches of non-discretionary trust duties. The third dimension 
to the primary responsibility of express trustees is that they must fulfill 
it in accordance with the dictates of the fundamental fiduciary duty of 
loyalty. 
One consequence of the primacy of the terms of the express trust is 
that, generally speaking, express trustees are meant to act independently 
of the beneficiaries in the sense that they are not generally regarded as 
under the control of their beneficiaries. Express trustees are accountable 
to their beneficiaries, but not subject to direction by those beneficiaries. 
In turn, where the terms of an express trust diverge from the wishes of 
beneficiaries, tensions can arise between trustees and their beneficiaries. 
Likewise, to the extent that an express trustee may be granted discretion, 
tension can arise where the express trustee and a beneficiary diverge in 
their opinion of what is in the best interests of a beneficiary in relation to 
exercise of the discretion. For that matter, a similar tension can arise for 
any other fiduciary. 
It is at this point though that the more specific rights and 
responsibilities of different types of trustees need to be attuned to the 
21. Trust law draws a fundamental distinction between fixed and discretionary 
trusts. In a fixed trust, the trustee has no discretion as to identifying the 
beneficiaries of the trust or as to identifying the amounts or shares of 
trust property that each shall receive. A discretionary trust arises where 
discretion of either type is allowed to the trustee. See e.g. Albert H 
Oosterhoff et al, Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials, 7d 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 20.
22. It should be noted that there is a limited statutory right to be excused of 
liability for actions by trustees that, although technically breaches of the 
terms of the trust, are taken honestly, in good faith and with reasonable 
care: Trustee Act, RSO 1990, c T.23, s 35.
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nature and circumstances of their trusts. The principle of the primacy of 
the terms of the trust is most applicable in the context of express trusts, 
where the terms are deliberately and explicitly articulated. By extension, 
trustees of express trusts are also understood to enjoy a meaningful degree 
of autonomy in relation to the wishes of the beneficiaries of express 
trusts, at least to the extent that the terms of the trust do not provide 
to the contrary. In other words, unless arising expressly or by necessary 
implication from the terms of an express trust, an express trustee is not 
subject to a “beneficiary-direction rule”. In contrast, and at the other end 
of the spectrum, trustees in constructive trust situations, which generally 
arise through wrongful conduct, rather than deliberate creation, typically 
have no right to act independently and are essentially awaiting directions 
from the victim of their wrongful conduct, who will be the beneficial 
owner, as to when and to whom to transfer the property. In the middle of 
this spectrum are trustees of resulting trusts, which, as discussed in Part II, 
arise from a combination of intention and circumstances that, in theory, 
are distinguishable from those giving rise to express trusts. The degree 
of autonomy available to a resulting trustee will vary in accordance with 
variation in the intention and circumstances from which the resulting 
trust arises.23 For his part, Chambers analyzes a number of factors 
potentially relevant to defining the obligations of resulting trustees and 
argues for adherence to the following general markers.24 To begin with, 
he argues that where a resulting trust arises from circumstances associated 
with the failure of an express trust, the resulting trustee should be subject 
to the same duties as would have applied to the express trustee, had the 
express trust not failed. Consequently, whether the resulting trustee in 
this situation was subject to the beneficiary-direction rule would depend 
23. It should be noted that, in Penner’s view, all resulting trustees (in 
presumed intention situations) should be treated as bare trustees but with 
the proviso that as soon as any intention beyond allocation of beneficial 
ownership is alleged or identified, the situation should be approached 
as one of informal express trust, rather than resulting trust: see Jamie E 
Penner, The Law Of Trusts, 6d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 
106.
24. Chambers, Resulting Trusts, supra note 4 at 219.
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upon the intended terms of the failed express trust. Next, but at the other 
end of the spectrum, where a resulting trust arises in circumstances where 
the resulting trustee is an innocent recipient of the property bound by 
the trust, the only duty of the resulting trustee ought to be to convey 
the property at the beneficiary’s request. In other words, the beneficiary-
direction rule should apply. Finally, and more generally, Chambers argues 
that although knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to a resulting 
trust should not be a prerequisite to the recognition of the existence of 
the resulting trust, liability for breach of fiduciary obligations associated 
with the resulting trust should not arise until the resulting trustee has 
such knowledge. Putting all of this together, and bearing in mind the 
context of the present discussion of older adult joint bank accounts, 
it would appear possible to contend that where a resulting trustee has 
assumed that role voluntarily, and with knowledge of the circumstances 
giving rise to the resulting trust, including an appreciation of the 
intention behind those circumstances, then the nature and content of her 
rights and responsibilities ought to be understood more in accordance 
with the approach taken to those of an express trustee than to those of 
a constructive trustee or an innocent or unknowing resulting trustee. 
For present purposes, the key distinction between the two ends of this 
spectrum is the extent to which the resulting trustee should be subject 
to the beneficiary-direction rule. Constructive trustees and innocent or 
unknowing resulting trustees are essentially required to act as directed 
by the beneficiary. In other words, the fundamental obligation to act in 
the best interests of the beneficiary collapses into an obligation to act 
according to the wishes of the beneficiary. In contrast, express trustees 
are primarily required to act as directed by the terms of the trust and 
not generally meant to act at the direction of the beneficiaries, except 
as required by those terms. Further, to the extent that the terms of an 
express trust allow an express trustee to exercise discretion, he or she is 
legally understood as enjoying what might be called a “zone of autonomy” 
in relation to the wishes of the beneficiary, albeit a zone that is always to 
be navigated only in accordance with an assessment of the best interests 
of the beneficiary (and with honesty, good faith and reasonable care). 
Most significantly for present purposes, this legal understanding enables 
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an express trustee, in determining how to exercise his or her discretion, 
to independently consider whether the wishes of the beneficiaries align 
with their best interests and to act against those wishes where the trustee 
deems it appropriate to do so.
In the context of the present inquiry, this legal understanding that 
an express trustee may refuse to follow the wishes of the beneficiaries 
in order to protect the best interests of those beneficiaries amounts to 
a legal recognition that the express trustee has a beneficiary-protection 
power. Confirmation of the legal recognition of this power can be found 
in, for instance, the longstanding precedent in Tempest v Lord Camoys25 
(“Tempest”), where the English Court of Appeal strongly affirmed the 
zone of autonomy for express trustees in the context of a dispute over 
a decision that can be regarded as protectively-motivated. In Tempest, 
the two express trustees had to make a decision about what land to 
purchase with certain trust funds. While the terms of the trust required 
that the funds be used for a land purchase, the trustees had to exercise 
their discretion as to what land to purchase. The adult beneficiaries of 
the trust requested that the trustees use the funds to purchase a property 
that had historic significance for the Tempest family. To do so, the trust 
would have had to take out a mortgage on the property to complete the 
purchase, but the power to mortgage was a power enjoyed by the trustees. 
In assessing, as they were duty-bound to do, whether the purchase would 
25. (1882), 21 Ch D 571 (CA (Eng)); another foundational case on the 
zone of autonomy enjoyed by express trustees in discretionary matters 
is Gisborne v Gisborne (1877), 2 App Cas 300 (HL); for what remains 
an insightful analysis of the trajectory of judicial decision-making since 
those cases, see Maurice Cullity, “Judicial Control of Trustees’ Discretion” 
(1975) 25:2 University of Toronto Law Journal 99. Cullity’s analysis 
convincingly argues that courts have subsequently established that their 
power to intervene on grounds of mala fides in the exercise of discretion 
extends far beyond instances of fraud and now includes, for example, 
instances of consideration being given to irrelevant or extraneous factors 
— but that expansion does not contradict the legitimacy of trustees’ 
consideration of protective action. Cullity’s analysis has more recently 
been judicially approved in Fox v Fox Estate (1996), 28 OR (3d) 496 
(CA), per Galligan J.
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be in the best interests of the beneficiaries, one trustee was of the view 
that the purchase and mortgage was appropriate, while the other was 
not — seemingly due to a concern that it would be imprudent for the 
trust to burden its property with a mortgage. When the beneficiaries 
sought an order from a court to compel the transaction, both the trial 
and appeal courts refused the order. For its part, the Court of Appeal 
firmly stated the legal position that, where trustees have discretion, and 
properly exercise it, the courts should not intervene. As such, the decision 
in Tempest confirmed that trustees exercising discretionary powers enjoy 
a zone of autonomy from the wishes of their beneficiaries and are, in a 
nutshell, entitled to protect the beneficiaries from themselves.26
By analogy, it might be contended, a voluntary and knowing resulting 
trustee should also be regarded as enjoying a similarly structured zone of 
autonomy in relation to the wishes of the beneficiary of the resulting 
trust, subject to evidence of a contrary intention — that is, an intention 
for beneficiary-direction — existing when the circumstances of the 
resulting trust arose. By extension, to the extent that protective action 
might be justifiable by reference to the best interests of the beneficiary, it 
might then be argued that such a resulting trustee ought to be regarded 
as holding a beneficiary-protection power or, even, duty. 
There are, however, four main barriers to this analogizing of the 
position of the voluntary and knowing resulting trustee of an older adult 
joint bank account to the position of an express trustee. In the following 
part of this article, I will first identify these barriers and then discuss each 
in turn.
26. Another example of the legal legitimacy of express trustees acting 
protectively is the validation available to a trustee who seeks the assistance 
of a court to vary the terms of a trust in order to further the best interest 
of the beneficiaries by, for instance, postponing a disposition of property 
to a beneficiary to a time when the beneficiary ought to be adequately 
equipped to manage the property appropriately: see NS (Re), 2007 NSSC 
288. 
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IV. Barriers to a Beneficiary-Protection Power
The contention that, in relation to a potential power of beneficiary-
protection, the position of the voluntary and knowing resulting trustee 
of an older adult joint bank account can be analogized to the position 
of an express trustee faces the following four barriers. First, to the extent 
that existing case law from Canada, as well as England and Wales, and 
Australia, addresses the situation of voluntary and knowing resulting 
trustees of joint bank accounts, it all suggests that the beneficiary-
direction rule is paramount. Although this case law has only considered 
situations of allegations of selfish, rather than protective, conduct by the 
resulting trustees, it would seem to be strongly implied that there is no 
scope for recognition of a beneficiary-protection power. A second barrier, 
which reinforces the first, are concerns raised in Canadian precedents 
dealing with instances of beneficiary-protection action taken by non-
trustee fiduciaries with responsibilities for older adults, specifically, adult 
children with powers of attorney. To some extent, those concerns have 
revolved around issues of conflict of interest that would be applicable 
to the situation of joint bank account resulting trusts. In addition 
though, the concerns have been informed by judicial perceptions of the 
underlying interests at stake for older adults, and how they should be 
balanced, in part as reflected in statutory regimes applicable to assistive 
and substitute decision-making. Those interests, and the fact they are 
defined, prioritized and balanced in ways that can be regarded as running 
counter to a beneficiary-protection power, then represent a third barrier 
to analogizing the position of voluntary and knowing resulting trustees 
to that of express trustees. The fourth barrier to the analogy is that in 
the resulting trust situation, the relevant beneficiary is also and always 
the same person whose actions and intention drove the creation of the 
resulting trust. This can be contrasted with express trust situations, where 
the creator of the trust, if a beneficiary at all, will often be but one of 
numerous beneficiaries. Generally speaking, it might be argued, the 
creator of an express trust, even if he or she will also be a beneficiary, 
is likely to be more aware of the significance of his or her actions, in 
terms of giving over control to the trustee, than would the creator of a 
resulting trust. Indeed, that awareness may explain why an older adult 
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would create a joint bank account instead of creating an express trust. In 
turn, the potential for that awareness may need to inform the approach 
equity takes to the rights and responsibilities of resulting trustees. I will 
now discuss each of these barriers in more depth.
A. Barrier #1: The Paramountcy of the Beneficiary-
Direction Rule
This section provides a review of two relevant and representative lines 
of reasoning emanating from cases in Canada, England and Wales, and 
Australia dealing with rights and responsibilities of resulting trustees in 
the context of older adult joint bank accounts. 
One line of reasoning addresses situations where adult child co-
holders of joint bank accounts are accused of financially abusing the 
older adult by using the funds for their own benefit. Claims against 
these adult children are usually based on breach of trust and breach of 
fiduciary obligations. Generally speaking, where wrongful conduct is 
found, the wrong is said to consist in a departure from the rule that 
resulting trustees of joint bank accounts can only act as directed by the 
older adult — that is, a violation of the beneficiary-direction rule. Where 
an adult child resulting trustee acts so as to benefit him or herself, either 
without direction from the older adult or contrary to directions, then 
both a breach of trust and a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred. 
An example of the application of the beneficiary-direction rule in 
England and Wales is provided by Re Northall (Deceased),27 where an 
aging mother deposited the proceeds of a sale of her home into a joint 
bank account created with one of her adult sons. The son made a number 
of withdrawals from the account during the lifetime of his mother and 
withdrew the balance for his own benefit following her death. A dispute 
arose over whether the balance in the account ought to have formed part 
of the mother’s estate and this led to questions being raised about the 
propriety of the other withdrawals made during the mother’s life that 
did not appear to be for the mother’s benefit. Applying the presumption 
of resulting trust, the court held that it had not been rebutted, either 
27. Northall, supra note 3.
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with respect to the beneficial interest in the funds during the mother’s 
lifetime, nor with respect to the right to survivorship. Then applying the 
beneficiary-direction rule, and finding that the mother had not requested 
or consented to the co-holding son’s withdrawals, the court ordered him 
to account for those withdrawals and the balance. 
To similar effect is the Canadian decision in Miller v Miller,28 where 
a recently separated older woman deposited the proceeds of a significant 
disbursement from a trust in her favour into a joint bank account she 
created with one of her adult daughters. The daughter made numerous 
large withdrawals from the joint account for her own benefit. Although 
the daughter even went so far as to have her mother removed from the 
daughter’s home, where she was then living, to a psychiatric ward, the 
mother eventually received assistance from her estranged husband and 
brought an action to recover her funds. Applying the presumption of 
resulting trust, the court held that it had not been rebutted in relation to 
the beneficial interest in the funds in the joint account during the mother’s 
lifetime (but did not need to address the beneficial interest in the right 
to survivorship). The court then ordered the daughter to account for the 
withdrawn funds on two bases that were regarded as distinct. One basis 
was conversion, which was founded on breach of the beneficiary-direction 
rule. As reasoned by the court, when a resulting trustee in the position of 
the daughter makes withdrawals without the knowledge or permission of 
the older adult beneficiary then she has converted the funds to her own 
use. The alternative basis was breach of fiduciary duty. The relevance of 
fiduciary obligations was not based on the daughter’s status as a resulting 
trustee but, rather, was built on reasoning that applied the principles for 
determining whether an ad hoc or fact-based fiduciary relationship had 
been brought into existence. Finding that the daughter had knowingly 
undertaken a fiduciary position with respect to her mother, the court 
had no trouble finding that her self-interested withdrawals violated her 
fiduciary obligation to act only in the best interests of her beneficiary.
As illustrated by both Re Northall and Miller, the beneficiary-direction 
rule is entirely adequate for bringing to account a resulting trustee who 
28. Miller, supra note 3.
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acts in a self-interested way. But the beneficiary-direction rule would also 
preclude a resulting trustee from acting in a protective manner against 
the wishes or without the knowledge of the beneficiary. In other words, 
the beneficiary-direction rule appears to eliminate any zone of autonomy 
for a resulting trustee to assess and safeguard the best interests of the 
beneficiary. In that sense then, this line of reasoning erects a first barrier 
to analogizing a resulting trustee to an express trustee in relation to a 
zone of autonomy and a beneficiary-protection power. However, I have 
noted the fiduciary basis of liability in Miller because it may open an 
alternative pathway to a protective responsibility. Similarly, and perhaps 
more feasibly than the Miller alternative, there is another line of reasoning 
emanating from other cases dealing with older adult joint bank accounts 
that raises the possibility of regarding the circumstances as ultimately 
giving rise to an express trust, rather than a resulting trust. I will now 
discuss illustrative examples of this line of reasoning. 
The reasoning in these other cases essentially proceeds on the basis 
that presumptions of either resulting trust or advancement can be rebutted 
by an intention to create an express trust, although that result has so far 
only been reached in relation to the right to survivorship in joint bank 
accounts. An example of this is provided by the Australian case of Logan 
v Gardiner29 (“Logan”), in which an older adult mother was the sole 
depositor to a joint account opened with her adult daughter. At the same 
time, the mother attached a note to her will that provided instructions 
on the distribution of the funds in the joint account. Following the 
mother’s death, the co-holding daughter, who was also administrator 
of her estate, set about distributing the funds in accordance with the 
instructions, although only with respect to herself and her immediate 
family. While acknowledging the entitlements of other family members, 
the daughter assumed for herself a degree of discretion in distributions 
to them that was held to be inconsistent with the terms of the mother’s 
note. In the course of litigation brought by those other family members 
for misadministration of the estate, the court found that the mother had 
intended to create a secret trust over the right to survivorship relating to 
29. Logan, supra note 3.
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the joint account. Although the reasoning is not entirely straightforward, 
it appears that this intention was treated as rebutting the presumption 
of advancement (it was the presumption of advancement that applied, 
rather than the presumption of resulting trust, because, as discussed 
earlier, in Australia, the presumption of advancement continues to 
operate in favour of adult children as well as minor children). All parties 
appeared to accept that there was no intention on the part of the mother 
to give up control or use of the funds during her lifetime. Having found 
that a secret trust had been created, the court faulted the co-holding 
daughter for assuming too great a discretion to herself as the trustee, in 
contradiction of the terms of the secret trust. She was thus ordered to 
distribute the funds in accordance with the mother’s intentions. 
To similar effect is the appeal decision in the Canadian case of 
Sawdon Estate v Sawdon,30 in which a father converted a number of bank 
accounts into joint accounts with two of his sons. Following the death 
of the father, a dispute arose over whether the balances of the various 
accounts ought to form part of the residue of his estate, which residue 
had been left to a religious organization. The trial court found that the 
co-holding sons had been instructed by their father that the balances 
in the various accounts were to be distributed equally among his five 
children, including themselves. According to the trial court, in agreeing 
to this arrangement, the two co-holding sons became either express 
trustees of the right to survivorship or recipients of a conditional gift of 
the right to survivorship. At the same time though, the trial court found 
that the presumption of resulting trust had been rebutted in relation to 
the money in the various accounts during the father’s lifetime. In the 
words of the trial court, this meant that the father had made immediate 
inter vivos gifts of the funds (a result that was akin to the decision reached 
in Bakken Estate). On appeal, the somewhat contradictory nature of these 
holdings was corrected. Partially overruling the trial court, the appeal 
court held that the presumption of resulting trust had not been rebutted 
in relation to the control and use of the beneficial interest in the funds 
during the lifetime of the father. As for the arrangement with respect to 
30. Sawdon, supra note 3.
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the right of survivorship, the appeal court held that it was best understood 
as creating an express trust, with the two co-holdings sons as trustees and 
all of the children as beneficiaries. In other words, the intention to create 
an express trust displaced the presumption of resulting trust in relation 
to the right of survivorship.
The significance of the line of reasoning in cases such as Logan and 
Sawdon lies in the position that a presumption of resulting trust, or of 
advancement, can be rebutted, or displaced, by an intention to create 
an express trust. This is significant because it raises the possibility of 
finding that an express trust was created not only in relation to a right 
of survivorship in an older adult joint bank account, as in those two 
cases, but also in relation to the funds in the account during the older 
adult’s lifetime. After all, the intention of the older adult plays no less 
pivotal a role in the resulting trust analysis of the allocation of either 
type of beneficial interest. If it were possible to regard the adult child 
as (or, at least, as analogous to) an express trustee of the funds then, in 
turn, it could be argued that the adult child, as an express trustee, enjoys 
a presumptive zone of autonomy that includes a beneficiary-protection 
power. In this way, the barrier posed by the application of the beneficiary-
direction rule to resulting trustees could be sidestepped. And yet the 
possibility that an adult child might be regarded as (or analogous to) an 
express trustee of the funds in an older adult joint bank account during 
the older adult’s lifetime does not appear to have been raised in any cases 
— although, as noted above, it was suggested in Miller that the adult 
child might somehow be regarded as a stand-alone fiduciary.
Why might courts or counsel be overlooking or avoiding this express 
trust possibility? One reason might be that the framework of resulting 
trusts, and more particularly the constraints of the beneficiary-direction 
rule that it imposes, are perceived as more appropriate to the situation, 
for the very reason that they preclude the zone of autonomy that might 
be presumptively enjoyed by an express trustee or ad hoc fiduciary. A 
source of reinforcement for any such perception, and the second barrier 
to be addressed, is the concerns raised in Canadian cases dealing with 
adult child holders of powers of attorney who purport to act to protect 
the interest of their older adult beneficiaries but without the parents’ 
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knowledge or consent. 
B. Barrier #2: The Mixed Treatment of, and Concerns 
Raised About, Beneficiary-Protection Powers
Precedent is scarce on the issue of the validity of a beneficiary-protection 
power for non-trustee fiduciaries. The little that exists is mixed on the 
issue and raises some potentially significant concerns that would require 
attention if resulting trustees were analogized to express trustees.31 Two 
Canadian cases that represent the mixed treatment and also illustrate 
relevant concerns will be discussed in this section. The first case, Banton 
v Banton,32 is receptive to a beneficiary-protection power where a 
beneficiary lacks competence to manage their own property, but raises 
concerns about conflict of interest. The second, McMullen v Webber33 
(“McMullen”), is negative and raises concerns about properly respecting 
the autonomy of older adults.
Banton involved an elderly and twice-widowed father who was 
31. A search of case law databases covering Canada, England and Wales, and 
Australia identified only two Canadian cases discussed in this section 
as addressing what could be regarded claims to a beneficiary-protection 
power by non-trustee fiduciaries. A further Canadian case is Fareed v 
Wood, [2005] OTC 526 (Ont Ct J)(in which a lawyer was held to have 
violated his fiduciary duties as both solicitor to, and holder of power 
of attorney for, an older adult when he accepted responsibility for 
managing some of her financial affairs but then failed to properly account 
for or explain a depletion of her assets) [Fareed]. Although it was the 
older adult herself who had transferred away her assets, the lawyer was 
present at meetings between the older adult and the person to whom 
she made the transfers but when, following her death, he was asked by 
beneficiaries under her will to account for the assets, he refused to provide 
an explanation. While Fareed would therefore appear to be imposing 
a beneficiary-protection duty on a non-trustee fiduciary, this seems to 
have been based upon a judicial approach that treated the lawyer, in the 
circumstances (which also included indications that the older adult had 
lost capacity to manage her property), as a de facto express trustee and 
essentially faulted him for failing to adequately account for a depletion of 
trust assets.
32. (1998), 164 DLR (4th) 176 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)) [Banton].
33. 2006 BCSC 1656 [McMullen].
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subjected to the undue influence of a much younger woman who was an 
employee in the nursing home where he resided. Under her influence, and 
as his mental capacity deteriorated, the father married the woman and 
altered his will and powers of attorney in her favour. The factual history 
was substantial and convoluted and by the time of the litigation gave rise 
to myriad complicated legal issues. This included a need to define and 
apply the different legal test for determining mental capacity to marry, 
testamentary capacity, capacity to manage property and capacity to 
grant powers of attorney for property and for personal care. For present 
purposes, the key event was the joint decision by the father’s two sons, 
acting on the authority of the continuing power of attorney that they 
jointly held, to protectively transfer some of their father’s assets into an 
irrevocable trust for his benefit during his lifetime, with remainder to be 
shared equally between themselves and their siblings. One of the grounds 
upon which the validity of this express trust was contested was that the 
assets that it protected had been improperly distributed to the father, by 
the sons, as trustees of an earlier express trust established by the father. 
Under that earlier express trust, the father and his then wife had a life 
interest, with remainder to be shared equally between the sons and their 
siblings. The trial judge, Justice Cullity (who is a recognized expert in the 
trusts field), held that the sons had improperly distributed the capital of 
that express trust to the father. Consequently, the sons had no power to 
establish a new trust, even though in similar terms, with what remained 
of that same capital. Nevertheless, Cullity J went on to consider the 
further and alternative allegation that the new trust was also an invalid 
exercise of the continuing power of attorney and this is the allegation that 
is of most immediate relevance.
In the course of considering this allegation, Cullity J discussed the 
nature of the rights and responsibilities of holders of a continuing power 
of attorney, as well as the legitimacy of protective action. Two key points 
emerge from the discussion. First, Cullity J took the position that a 
general power of attorney — that is, one that applies while the donor/
beneficiary is mentally competent — essentially establishes an agency 
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relationship in which the beneficiary-direction rule is paramount.34 In 
contrast, according to Cullity J, where there is a continuing power of 
attorney, and the beneficiary has thus been found to lack capacity to 
manage property, “[t]he status of such an attorney is much closer to that 
of a trustee than an agent of the donor”.35 In the eyes of the court, the 
significance of this shift lay in the extent and degree of the fiduciary 
duties owed to the donor: “[a]s an agent, such an attorney owes fiduciary 
duties to the donor but these are pale in comparison with those of an 
attorney holding a continuing power when the donor has lost capacity to 
manage property”.36 The second key point made by Cullity J was that the 
holder of a continuing power of attorney does have the power to establish 
an express trust on behalf of the donor and is not precluded from doing 
so for protective reasons. However, given the heightened fiduciary duties, 
akin to those of trustees, the court will closely scrutinize the attorney’s 
actions and, in particular, will be concerned both with any appearance of 
conflict of interest or self-benefit and also with any measures that curtail 
the donor’s rights to a greater extent than necessary. In the course of 
elaborating this point, Cullity J observed as follows:
I do not share the view that there is an inviolable rule that it is improper for 
attorneys under a continuing power [of attorney] to take title to the donor’s 
assets either by themselves or jointly with the donor. This must depend upon 
whether it is reasonable in the particular circumstances to do so to protect or 
advance the interests, or otherwise benefit, the donor. It is conceivable that 
circumstances in which this would be reasonable may arise, although I think 
the burden of demonstrating that this is so should be on the attorneys if the 
propriety or reasonableness of their conduct is challenged. The authorities 
that condemn such acts of attorneys where the donor has capacity to manage 
property are not in point.37
Ultimately, although Cullity J expressed the view that the sons had 
acted at all times in good faith, with selfless motivations, and with valid 
concerns, he held that the sons had gone too far in three respects: in 
creating remainder interests in themselves and their siblings; in the extent 
to which the establishment of the trust would nullify the legal capacities 
34. Banton, supra note 32 at para 150.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid at para 157.
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that the father was still deemed mentally capable of exercising; and, in 
the potential detrimental impact on the statutory rights of the father’s 
new spouse upon his death. A more reasonable approach, according to 
Cullity J, would have been to vest the remainder in the father’s estate. 
The decision in Banton therefore has mixed implications for the 
possibility of validating a beneficiary-protection power for resulting 
trustees by analogizing them to express trustees. On the one hand, Banton 
offers some legal legitimacy to the basic idea that a beneficiary-protection 
power can be integrated into the rights and responsibilities of those 
fiduciaries who are regarded as akin to express trustees. On the other hand 
though, in drawing a distinction between the rights and responsibilities 
attaching to holders of general and continuing powers of attorney, with 
the former being framed more as agents, Banton reinforces the idea that it 
is more appropriate for resulting trustees, whose beneficiaries are typically 
mentally competent, to be subject to a beneficiary-direction rule. In 
addition, in drawing attention to the issue of conflict of interest and 
self-benefit, the decision in Banton raises an issue that could be expected 
to often arise for adult child resulting trustees of joint bank accounts 
because it is they who will typically stand to ultimately benefit from a 
preservation of the joint bank account funds, either as beneficiaries of 
the right of survivorship or as heirs to the estate. To the extent that an 
appearance of a conflict of interest might be an inevitable aspect of the 
adult child resulting trustee’s situation, a preference for the beneficiary-
direction rule may be more appropriate.
Insofar as Banton associates holders of general powers of attorney 
with a beneficiary-direction rule, and by implication also associates 
resulting trustees with that rule, it is reinforced by the decision in the 
second illustrative case. The litigation in McMullen revolved around the 
actions of the two daughters who jointly held, with their brother, power 
of attorney in relation to their older adult father. The power of attorney, 
which enabled the attorneys to do on the father’s behalf anything that he 
could lawfully do by an attorney, required that any two of the three co-
holders could act together under it and was granted in accordance with 
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the Power of Attorney Act.38 The father executed the power of attorney 
just a few months before the death of his wife, following which he relied 
upon his family for emotional support and financial advice. One of the 
daughters was particularly active in assisting her father with organizing 
his financial affairs and assessing his financial needs. Over the ensuing 
months the father’s children became concerned that he was depressed, 
acting erratically and being financially exploited by a new romantic 
partner whom he had met on a vacation he took following his wife’s 
death. Eventually, the daughters utilized the power of attorney to transfer 
99% of the value of the father’s last remaining significant asset — his 
condominium — to their spouses. This was despite the fact that, on 
two occasions during the period of rising concerns among his children, 
the father’s mental capacity had been professionally assessed and found 
sufficient to continue managing his own financial affairs. The daughters’ 
purported motivation was to protect the property for the longer-term 
benefit of the father, although they did not inform him of the transaction 
for fear of upsetting him. Nevertheless, when the father eventually 
discovered the transaction he immediately called for a reversal and began 
litigation to set it aside, arguing that the daughters had improperly 
exercised their powers of attorney.
The court accepted that the daughters were genuinely motivated by a 
concern for the best interests of their father and also accepted that there 
was evidence that the father’s behavior had changed significantly. Indeed, 
the court also accepted that there was evidence that the father may have 
been a victim of financial exploitation. However, since there was no 
evidence that the father had become incapable of managing his financial 
affairs and, in fact, given that there was evidence to the opposite effect, 
it was held that the daughters had violated a duty to provide the father 
with an accounting of his finances, and had also violated a beneficiary-
direction rule, both of which bound them as fiduciary obligations 
associated with their role as attorneys.
For present purposes, the failure to account need not be addressed. 
The more immediately relevant aspect of McMullen is the application 
38. RSBC 1996, c 370.
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of the beneficiary-direction rule in this non-trustee context. There is 
little reasoning in the case as to why the beneficiary-direction rule ought 
to apply. The decision quotes a Canadian lower court precedent which 
states that the holder of a power of attorney is a fiduciary and that, as 
such, the attorney has a duty to account, to exercise reasonable care 
and to “not act contrary to the interests of the donor”.39 That precedent 
would not appear to be decisive though, since acting protectively is not 
necessarily acting contrary to best interests. The decision goes on to 
advert to a common statutory rule that renders invalid any transfer by 
an attorney, to him or herself, of property belonging to the beneficiary, 
unless expressly authorized or ratified by the beneficiary. But that rule is 
also not decisive because the transaction at issue in McMullen was not 
quite of that type. The pivotal component of the reasoning thus becomes 
the judge’s subsequent statement that “the fiduciary relationship created 
the duty to act only in accordance with the donor’s intentions”40 and 
that, regardless of the protective motivation, in acting without the father’s 
knowledge or consent, this duty had been breached. In other words, the 
key argument is that acting in accordance with the donor-beneficiaries 
intent can only be achieved if acting with his knowledge and consent — 
which amounts to an application of the beneficiary-direction rule.
Despite the shortcomings in this chain of reasoning as to the 
applicability of the beneficiary-direction rule to holders of powers of 
attorney, it must be acknowledged that it is consistent with the legal 
position that is basically taken for granted in Banton (and, for that 
matter, in treatises on trusts law).41 Rather than, as in Banton, analogizing 
the position of the joint-attorney daughters to the position of agents 
though, the judge in McMullen found reinforcement in the nature and 
limits of related statutory regimes and the ways in which those regimes 
express and balance relevant interests. This brings me to the third barrier 
standing in the way of recognition of a beneficiary-protection power for 
39. McMullen, supra note 33 at para 52, quoting from Andreasen v Daniels-
Ferrie, 2001 BCSC 1503 at para 27, per Quijano J.
40. McMullen, supra note 33 at para 57.
41. See discussion in Waters et al, Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada, 3d 
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 53.
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resulting trustees.
C. Barrier #3: The Interests of Older Adults and the 
Balances Struck in Statutory Regimes
The typical parameters of Canadian statutory regimes dealing with the 
related issues of assisted and substitute decision-making are illustrated in 
the statutory framework discussed by the judge in McMullen. The judge 
adverted to this framework in addressing the argument, made on behalf 
of the daughters, that since the daughters’ spouses were holding their 
newly acquired interests in the father’s condominium in trust for the 
father, they ought to be allowed to continue to do so unless and until the 
father could prove that he was competent to manage his financial affairs 
in his own best interests and, most importantly, free from manipulation 
and exploitation. On behalf of the father, it was countered that this 
was reversing the onus of proof in relation to capacity, contrary to the 
presumption of capability contained in the Adult Guardianship Act.42 
Moreover, accepting the daughters’ argument would also improperly 
circumvent the provisions of the Patients Property Act that establishes the 
process for applications for substitute decision-making power on the basis 
of mental incapacity.43 On these issues the court essentially sided with the 
father. In doing so, the court first invoked a basic legal principle that “[t]
he law does not require individuals to make decisions in their own best 
interests”.44 In fact, the court noted, this guiding principle was reflected 
in one of the statutory principles formulated to guide administration and 
interpretation under the Adult Guardianship Act: “all adults are entitled 
to live in the manner they wish and to accept or refuse support, assistance 
or protection as long as they do not harm others and they are capable of 
making decisions about those matters”.45 Against the backdrop of this 
42. RSBC 1996, c 6, s 3(1) [Adult Guardianship Act]. A similar presumption 
is found, for example, in section 2(1) of the Substitute Decisions Act, SO 
1992, c 30 [Substitute Decisions Act].
43. RSBC 1996, c 34,. ss. 2-3. A similar process is prescribed, for example, in 
the Substitute Decisions Act, supra note 42, ss 16(1), 16(2).
44. McMullen, supra note 33 at para 67.
45. Adult Guardianship Act, supra note 42, s 2(a).
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statutory framework, the judge refused to take up the invitation, from 
the daughters’ counsel, to “fill the gap” into which the circumstances of 
the case purportedly fell. That gap was the lack of legal power to take 
protective action in relation to a person, such as the father, who had not 
crossed a legal threshold of incapacity to manage his own affairs but who 
appeared to be emotionally and psychologically vulnerable to exploitation 
and to acting uncharacteristically and unwisely. In refusing to fill this 
gap, the judge expressed “considerable empathy” for the father’s family 
and acknowledged the dilemma that they faced, however, she stated: 
[t]he issues involved in filling the gap in the law are complex and controversial. 
Principles of personal autonomy conflict with principles of protection for 
vulnerable individuals. Legislation dealing with incompetent persons … 
provide blunt instruments to address problems of incapacity. There are few 
tools which address the issue of exploitation of vulnerable individuals … Given 
this complex arena, it is not for this Court to fill the legislative gap, particularly 
given the evidence in this case.46
…
Removing an individual’s autonomy is extremely significant. Mr. McMullen 
is entitled to live his life as he wishes unless and until he is found to be 
incompetent to manage his own affairs.47
The interests identified by the judge in these passages, and the position 
taken on how to weigh and balance them, are broadly reflective of 
the current approaches taken by older adult advocacy organizations 
and authoritative law reform bodies.48 For instance, in 2012 the Law 
Commission of Ontario (“LCO”) concluded a multi-year study to 
formulate A Framework for the Law as it Affects Older Adults and that 
framework is built upon a recognition of the following fundamental 
principles for promoting substantive equality for older adults: respecting 
46. McMullen, supra note 33 at para 72.
47. Ibid at para 76.
48. See e.g. UK, Law Commission, Adult Social Care Report, Law Com No 
326 (London: The Stationary Office, 2011) at para 4.26; Ireland, The Law 
Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Law and the Elderly (LRC CP 
23)(Dublin: The Law Reform Commission, 2003) at 158-59; Australia, 
Cth, Seniors’ Rights Victoria, Submission to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission: Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Law by 
Lauren Adamson, Melanie Perkins & Faith Hawthorne (Melbourne: June 
2014) at 3.
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dignity and worth; fostering independence and autonomy; promoting 
participation and inclusion; recognizing the importance of security; 
responding to diversity and individuality; and, understanding membership 
in the broader community.49 In elaborating upon these principles, the 
LCO noted not only that they are interdependent but also that there 
may be tensions between them. Although the report does not specifically 
address the issue of beneficiary-protection, in the course of discussing the 
principles, the LCO seems to favour an approach that reflects the position 
taken in McMullen. This is evident in the general endorsement given to 
a submission by the Advocacy Center for the Elderly, a longstanding and 
highly respected specialty legal clinic in Toronto, and the inclusion of the 
following quotation from them in the report: 
[the principle of security should address] possible vulnerabilities of older adults, 
whether short-term or long-term, without discounting the principles of dignity, 
independence and participation. The LCO is discouraged from recommending 
a framework based on the notion of vulnerability and a perception that older 
adults lack capacity and need protection.50
Ultimately then, when it comes to considering the interests of older 
adults that are at stake in assessing the merits of equitable recognition 
of a beneficiary-protection power, the position adopted by the judge in 
McMullen appears not only generally consistent with relevant statutory 
frameworks but also generally consistent with the approach preferred by 
a representative leading older adult advocacy organization and a recently 
concluded representative law reform initiative. That position involves 
a prioritizing of dignity, autonomy and independence over protection. 
A key reason for that prioritization is a deep-seated concern over the 
49. Law Commission of Ontario, A Framework for the Law as it Affects 
Older Adults: Advancing Substantive Equality for Older Persons through 
Law, Policy and Practice, final report (Toronto: April 2012) at 86 [Law 
Commission of Ontario, Advancing Substantive Equality].
50. Ibid at 95, citing Advocacy Centre for the Elderly, Submission to the Law 
Commission of Ontario Concerning the Law as it Affects Older Adults (July 
2008) at 5.
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debilitating effects on older adults of paternalistic treatment.51 Clearly 
enough, there is a very real danger that purportedly protective action 
may be motivated by or amount to paternalism and so it follows that 
there would be a general preference for a beneficiary-direction rule over a 
beneficiary-protection power. In turn, this approach would count against 
any move to analogize the position of a voluntary and knowing resulting 
trustee to the position of an express trustee. Similarly, it would also justify 
a refusal to explore the possibility of regarding an adult child co-holder 
of a joint bank account as an express trustee, rather than a resulting 
trustee, of the beneficial interest held by an older adult in the funds in 
the account during his or her lifetime. In each case, to the extent that a 
move towards an express trusteeship would potentially open the door to a 
beneficiary-protection power, a consideration of the underlying interests 
at stake for older adults, and in particular the risk of paternalism, would 
discourage that move. 
This brings me to a discussion of a fourth and final barrier to 
analogizing the adult child resulting trustee to an express trustee, namely, 
the basic dis-analogy that might exist in the mind of the older adult. 
At the same time though, this discussion leads to an identification of 
what would appear to be the most appropriate means of managing the 
dilemma of beneficiary-protection.
D. Barrier #4: The Dis-Analogy of Resulting and Express 
Trusts 
The key component of the dis-analogy between resulting and express 
trusts is the potential for an affirmative perception, in the mind of the 
older adult, that the arrangement of an express trust necessarily involves 
a degree of giving up of control over assets to the express trustee, whereas 
the arrangement from which the resulting trust arises does not. The 
existence of this affirmative perception may be attributable to the older 
adult’s general or particular knowledge or experience, or to legal or other 
51. The problem of paternalism is emphasized by the Law Commission of 
Ontario in its discussion of the key ways in which “ageism” can manifest: 
Law Commission of Ontario, Advancing Substantive Equality, supra note 
49 at 77-78. 
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professional advice, or both. Regardless, even if it is unlikely that an older 
adult would be aware of the phenomenon of the resulting trust, and even 
if similarly unlikely to have ever considered whether he or she preferred 
a beneficiary-direction rule or a beneficiary-protection power, it may be 
quite likely that an older adult perceives an express trust as involving a 
potentially significant degree of empowerment and independence of a 
trustee that he or she wishes to avoid. Moreover, it may be quite likely 
that an older adult comprehends that to create a joint bank account, on 
the basis of an understanding that the funds in the account will only be 
used for the older adult’s benefit during her lifetime, is not to create an 
express trust. To the extent that this is likely to be the state of an older 
adult’s perception, or to the extent that it makes sense to presume that 
this is what the older adult perceives, there is a further reason to resist 
analogizing the position of the adult child resulting trustee to that of an 
express trustee.
Put another way, this argument could be that the intention that 
is being investigated in relation to the issue of whether the older adult 
intended to retain or give up a beneficial interest has a different specificity 
or robustness than the intention that needs to be demonstrated in relation 
to the issue of whether an express trust has been created. In keeping with 
this argument, the explanation for why intentions to create express trusts 
have only been found in relation to rights of survivorship in joint bank 
accounts may simply be that it has only been in relation to that aspect 
of the accounts that the relevant specificity or robustness of intention — 
what I will call a requisite difference of intentionality — has been found 
to exist.
Having arrived at the point where the explanation for the preference 
for the beneficiary-direction rule over a beneficiary-protection power 
might be reinforced by reference to a difference of intentionality, we also 
arrive at the point where the most appropriate means of managing the 
dilemma of beneficiary-protection might be appearing. 
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V. The Possibility of an Expressed Intention for 
Beneficiary-Protection Power
On the basis of the foregoing discussion it seems reasonable for equity 
to approach joint bank account resulting trustee situations by imposing 
a beneficiary-direction rule and refusing a beneficiary-protection power. 
At the same time though, and especially given the role of intention in 
the recognition of resulting trusts, those positions could be regarded as 
not precluding a recognition that an older adult and co-holding adult 
child could agree that a beneficiary-protection power will be granted. 
In other words, the door should be left open to equitable recognition 
for situations where an older adult expresses an intention that their co-
holding adult child should hold a beneficiary-protection power. Arguably, 
this may involve a degree of intentionality that tips the situation from 
one of resulting trust to express trust but, since this tip would be based in 
an express intention, any such argument is really beside the point. 
If equity were to take the approach of only recognizing a beneficiary-
protection power on the basis of expressed intention, then there would 
still be a need to grapple with the task of establishing appropriate 
standards and tests for the valid exercise of such a power. This article 
does not seek to explore that territory, although attention can at least be 
drawn to the position expressed by Cullity J, as mentioned in the earlier 
discussion of Banton, that the onus for demonstrating the reasonableness 
of protective action might best be placed on the fiduciary — that is, in 
the context of joint bank account resulting trusts, the onus should be on 
the adult child resulting trustee. 
One further point, in relation to implications for the professional 
responsibility of lawyers, should also be noted. To the extent that the door 
is still open to equity recognizing an expressed intention for a beneficiary-
protection power, this may have significance for the lawyers and others 
who typically advise clients, either or both older adults and their adult 
children, on matters relating to joint bank accounts. Practically-speaking, 
the possibility that an older adult could expressly grant a beneficiary-
protection power may be of more interest to their potential co-holding 
adult children. But since either party may have some interest in the 
possibility, and since it now seems entirely predictable that circumstances 
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may arise where there is perceived to be a need to act protectively towards 
the older adult, it could be argued that discussion of the possibility of 
expressly granting a beneficiary-protection power should be regarded as 
a new element of due diligence and, therefore, professional responsibility 
for lawyers (or other professionals or service providers) who find 
themselves in the position of advising either or both of the older adult 
and the adult child on the creation of a joint bank account. 
VI. Conclusion
The rules and principles of equity play a significant role in defining and 
allocating the rights and responsibilities of adult children and older adult 
parents who are co-holders of joint bank accounts. In a typical situation, 
adult children are deemed by equity to be resulting trustees for their 
older adult parents in relation to the funds in the joint bank account, 
at least during the older adult’s lifetime. A particular concern in these 
contexts is financial abuse of older adults. In situations where the adult 
child resulting trustee is financially abusing the older adult, without her 
knowledge or consent, equity applies a rule of beneficiary-direction to 
resulting trustees. The beneficiary-direction rule is adequate to hold an 
abusing resulting trustee to account, but in doing so it appears to rule out 
recognition of a resulting trustee having a beneficiary-protection power, 
— that is, a power to act against the wishes of the older adult in order 
to protect her from financial abuse by others. In contrast, equitable rules 
relating to express trusts can be understood to preserve a zone of autonomy 
for discretionary responsibilities of express trustees and, in turn, this zone 
enables a beneficiary-protection power, subject always to the terms of the 
trust and an assessment of the best interests of the beneficiary. Given that 
the definition and allocation of the rights and responsibilities of resulting 
trustees needs to take account of the context within which the resulting 
trust arises, it might be argued that a voluntary and knowing resulting 
trustee of a joint bank account could be analogized to an express trustee, 
at least in terms of enabling a beneficiary-protection power. However, 
considerations of both precedent and policy give rise to a number of 
interconnected barriers to this analogy, specifically: (i) the paramountcy 
of the resulting trust approach and the beneficiary-direction rule in cases 
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addressing joint bank accounts; (ii) the mixed treatment of claims to a 
beneficiary-protection power in non-trust fiduciary contexts, including 
concerns raised over both conflict of interest and appropriate respect for 
the autonomy of older adults; (iii) the consistency between the judicial 
preference for the beneficiary-direction rule and the way in which related 
statutory regimes and law reform initiatives balance the interests of older 
adults, especially the importance of avoiding paternalism; and, finally, 
(iv) the likelihood that older adults may somewhat consciously prefer 
to avoid an express trust approach to joint bank accounts. In assessing 
these barriers, the analysis conducted in this article draws the conclusion 
that they are based on a solid and coherent foundation of equitable 
rules and principles and policy considerations. Ultimately, these barriers 
construct a strong argument that resulting trustees should not be 
analogized to express trustees in the sense that equity should continue 
to prefer a beneficiary-direction rule over a beneficiary-protection power 
in relation to resulting trustees. At the same time though, since it can be 
anticipated that a need for protective action might arise, and that a power 
to act protectively might be useful, the door should remain open to the 
possibility that equity would respect an express grant of protective power. 
This endorsement of equity’s apparent preference for a beneficiary-
direction rule over a beneficiary-protection power creates a difficult 
situation for adult children who are resulting trustees of joint bank 
accounts co-held with their older adult parents when they suspect that their 
parents are being financially manipulated and exploited. So long as the 
older adult parent retains mental capacity to manage her financial affairs, 
and so long as she expresses wishes to use the joint account in specified 
ways, the adult child who suspects that those wishes are symptoms of 
financial abuse is legally prohibited from taking preventative protective 
action by shifting the funds in the joint account out of the reach of the 
older adult. It can be anticipated that some adult children who face 
this difficult situation will nevertheless choose to take protective action 
because, practically-speaking, doing so may be effective in preventing the 
abuse and, in turn, the adult child may be willing to run the risk of 
negative legal consequences for such wrongful conduct. While it may be 
understandable that an adult child would opt for this risky route out of 
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the difficult situation, and while courts may be tempted to allow him or 
her to escape liability (after-all, “hard cases” are well-known to make “bad 
law”), it is important to realize that there are ways to avoid the difficult 
situation in the first place. One means of avoidance would be an express 
grant of a beneficiary-protection power to the resulting trustee. Another 
means would be to undertake the intentional creation of an express trust, 
rather than merely relying upon a presumed intention resulting trust. For 
either means to be available though, both the adult child and their older 
adult parent will need to be aware of the potential for a difficult situation 
to arise and the possibilities for managing or avoiding it. Ultimately, 
responsibility for establishing that awareness lies more in the realm of 
diligent legal/professional practice than equitable legal doctrine. The 
case law, such as Bakken Estate, provides numerous examples of legal and 
other professionals advising older adults about joint bank accounts in the 
context of broader discussions of capacity to manage financial affairs and 
estate planning. It would appear that the resulting trust approach to older 
adult joint bank accounts is often presented as an option of convenience. 
But with the problem of older adult financial abuse now clearly apparent, 
and with case law on the potential for a difficult situation to arise gradually 
accumulating, the best lesson for lawyers and other professionals to take 
from Bakken Estate, and other litigation of disputes over resulting trustees 
taking preventative protective action, may be the need to provide advice 
on the means for preventing resulting trustees from finding themselves in 
such difficult situations. 
